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    Abstract. 
 
This paper considers the possible connection between globalisation and inequality in 
Western welfare states. There are a number of theoretical reasons why increased trade 
and factor mobility should lead to more inequality in rich countries. At the same time, 
there are arguments why globalisation should also make it more difficult to 
redistribute incomes in favour of low-income groups, and this squeeze would seem to 
lead to severe difficulties for traditional welfare state policies. However, the empirical 
evidence for such a squeeze varies considerably between countries, and it is suggested 
that a richer framework than the standard competitive model is needed to understand 
the forces at work.  
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1. Introduction. 
 
Many observers have spotted a trend towards increased inequality in Western 
countries during the last couple of decades. Although the trend is not uniform, it is 
important enough to give cause for some worry, or at least to stimulate research into 
the underlying causes. Although I believe that there are a number of different causes 
whose relative importance is far from clear, the set of causes popularly known as 
globalisation certainly is one that has been emphasised by many observers. The 
general idea is that the liberalisation of commodity trade and factor movements in the 
international economic system has led to an increasing inequality of factor incomes, 
i.e. of incomes before taxes and transfers. If true, this would obviously also contribute 
to greater inequality in the standard of living, provided there are no offsetting 
movements in the degree of public sector redistribution policies. But if one imagines 
that national governments pursue policies that trade off efficiency, e.g. as measured 
by GDP per capita, against equality, then we would in fact expect to see such 
offsetting policy changes; more inequality should lead to more redistribution. If 
governments acted in this way, redistribution policy would modify the effects of 
increasing inequality of factor incomes on the degree of inequality in people's 
standard of living. 
 
However, many people claim that economic policy, instead of offsetting the forces 
making for greater inequality, will become increasingly powerless to achieve it. One 
argument that is invoked in support of this view is that the forces of globalisation 
impose constraints on the degree of redistribution via taxes, transfers and social 
security. When factors of production become more mobile, an attempt to redistribute 
factor incomes will affect the international allocation of capital and labour. Then an 
attempt to tax capitalists will lead to an outflow of capital. Attempts to redistribute 
labour incomes between rich and poor via progressive taxation and transfers to the 
poor will lead to emigration of the high- income earners and to immigration of people 
who are particularly in need of social support. A higher degree of international factor 
mobility thus implies that redistribution diminishes the tax base while increasing the 
pressure on public expenditure. The welfare state finds itself in a globalisation 
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squeeze between increased inequality on the one hand and less effective instruments 
to promote equality on the other. 
 
In the following I first look at the theoretical hypotheses that are used as 
underpinnings for these arguments. I then go on to look at some of the empirical 
evidence1.  
 
 
2. The causes of increased inequality. 
 
There is always the danger, when discussing globalisation and inequality, that either 
one’s audience or oneself is led to assume that globalisation is the only cause of 
increased inequality. But as I have already pointed out, to the extent that there is a 
general trend towards increased inequality, there are good reasons for believing that 
globalisation is only one element – although possibly an important one – in the set of 
underlying causes. To set the stage for a balanced treatment, I would therefore like to 
start with a summary review of the most important causes of increased inequality. 
 
First, it is widely believed that the development of technology has a built- in inequality 
bias. To an increasing extent, both manufacturing and services require high-skill 
employees, workers who are able to handle advanced technological equipment. Since 
the required skills are scarce, those who possess them will be able to sell their services 
at an increased premium in the labour market. Consequently, the skilled-unskilled 
wage differential increases. In an important econometric study, Krusell et. al. (2000) 
interprets this general hypothesis as capital-skill complementarity, i.e. as the 
hypothesis that capital accumulation raises the marginal productivity of skilled labour 
but reduces the marginal productivity of the unskilled. They find considerable support 
for this hypothesis in U.S data for 1963-1992, even though there was a substantial 
increase in the supply of skilled workers during the same period. However, their study 
makes no attempt to assess the relative importance of technological change with 
respect to other influences on inequality, such as globalisation.  
                                                 
1 For other treatments of this problem see Freeman (1995), Richardson (1995) and  Wood (1995). 
These articles constitute a symposium on inequality and trade in the Journal of Economic Perspectives. 
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Second, during the past couple of decades Western countries have gone through a 
period of deregulation and tax reform with increased emphasis on economic 
incentives. It is highly unlikely that ind ividuals will respond in a uniform way to 
improved incentives. Some will react to lower marginal tax rates by working harder 
and saving more, while others will change their behaviour only to a very small degree, 
leaving the increased opportunities unexploited. The consequence of this is that the 
former will increase their incomes relative to the latter. In this perspective, some 
increase of inequality in factor incomes is an expected and unavoidable consequence 
of the creation of improved incentives for economic efficiency. Blomquist et. al. 
(2001) present evidence indicating that the Swedish tax reform of the 1980s did 
indeed contribute to increased inequality. 
 
Third, we may have witnessed a change in social attitudes to inequality. The labour 
market, in particular, is a complex mechanism whose operation reflects more than just 
the impersonal forces of supply and demand. Wage differentials – at least at the level 
of the individual working place – must be seen as being reasonably fair to be socially 
acceptable. If they are not, they may give rise to social frictions, e.g. in the form of 
strikes, which will reduce efficiency. Thus, both workers and management may have 
an interest in holding down inequality in the workplace. But attitudes towards fairness 
and social acceptability may change. It may be that they have indeed changed in 
favour of more tolerance towards wage and income differentials, and that part of any 
increased inequality of gross labour incomes may be a reflection of this. 
 
These possible causes of increased inequality are probably not independent. Thus, for 
example, the tax reforms that have led to greater rewards to work effort and saving 
might not have come about if politicians had not perceived a change in the social 
climate that has made inequality of outcomes more acceptable. 
 
In the following I will concentrate on globalisation as the cause of increased 
inequality. In doing this I am well aware that I am conducting a partial analysis in 
which I am assuming that these other causes are somehow held constant. Ideally, 
                                                                                                                                            
A later symposium on globalisation in the same journal contains articles by Rodrik (1998a), Obstfeld 
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perhaps, one would have liked to conduct the analysis on the basis of a model where 
all these causes are present, and where, on the basis of econometric estimates, one 
would have been able to assess their relative importance. But, at least to my 
knowledge, such a model is not presently available. Even if it had been, a partial 
analysis which concentrates on the basic economic mechanisms that are likely to be at 
work, is helpful for an understand of the economics and politics of globalisation and 
inequality. 
 
 
3. Trade, factor movements and inequality. 
 
The term ‘globalisation’ does not have a precisely defined scientific content. In the 
following I shall loosely associate it with a larger volume of international 
transactions, both in commodities and in factors of production2. Globalisation is not a 
new phenomenon. During the second part of the 19th century there was a strong move 
towards the liberalisation of international transactions, and international trade 
expanded rapidly until the beginning of World War I. Then a decline set in which 
lasted until about 1960, after which there has been a new wave of globalisation 
(O'Rourke (2001), Feenstra (1998)).  Since then, the volume of trade in goods and 
services has gone up in most - but not in all - countries. Capital, both real and 
financial, has become more mobile. The mobility of labour is more open to debate. 
The general perception, especially in Europe, seems clearly to be that it has gone up, 
especially in terms of immigration from third world countries, and this is no doubt 
correct for the last couple of decades. However, there have been periods of history, in 
particular the century before World War 1, when labour mobility was significantly 
higher. At that time however, migrants flowed out of Europe, mainly to North 
America, and it did not change the ethnic and cultural character of the European 
countries. Our perceptions are probably much influenced by the fact that immigrants 
are more different from us than they used to be, and therefore more visible. The 
importance of immigration varies considerably between European countries, and in 
                                                                                                                                            
(1998), Feenstra (1998) and Williamson (1998) 
2 Some would no doubt consider this definition of globalisation as unduly narrow and would e.g. 
ascribe an important role to the information technology revolution. I do not wish to deny the 
importance of this, but for my present purposes the IT revolution is taken to be important only to the 
extent that it changes the real flows of goods and services. 
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some of them it is very low or insignificant. But in any case, potential immigration is 
probably high for most Western European countries; if all barriers to entry were 
removed, immigration would be likely to increase substantially. This in itself is cause 
enough to think seriously about the effects of increased immigration. 
  
However, I begin by assuming away factor mobility and revert to the classical 
assumption in the theory of international trade, which is that commodities are mobile 
across international borders, while factors of production are not. (This can be seen as 
a stylised version of the more reasonable and less restrictive assumption that 
commodities are more mobile than factors of production.) This makes it possible to 
think in a structured manner about the following question: What are the likely effects 
of increased trade liberalisation on the distribution of income in Western economies?  
 
In international trade theory it has been common to study the effect of trade 
liberalisation by assuming first that countries are in a state with no trade whatever. 
Relative prices will then be determined by supply and demand conditions in each 
individual country. Factor prices will be determined by country-specific scarcities; 
capital will be cheap in capital-rich countries, whereas labour will be cheap in 
countries with an abundance of labour. Goods that are capital- intensive in production 
will accordingly be cheap in capital-rich countries and expensive in countries whose 
endowment of capital is small relative to labour. If we disaggregate further, the theory 
implies that the skilled-unskilled wage differential will reflect the relative scarcities of 
the two classes of labour 3. 
 
Imagine now that the countries switch from a regime of isolation and protectionism to 
one of free international trade. Countries will then come to export the commodities 
that they can produce relatively cheaply. These will be the commodities making 
relatively intensive use of the abundant factors of production. Thus, countries that are 
rich in skilled labour will export skill- intensive products, and countries with an 
abundance of low-skilled labour will export commodities which require a lot of 
unskilled labour for their production.   
                                                 
3 As pointed out by Atkinson (1999), this two-way distinction between labour types is much too coarse. 
I use it here primarily to capture the general idea that some workers have more human capital and a 
higher productivity than others. 
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But in a competitive economy such a development will not leave factor prices 
unaffected. Take the case of the country that is rich in unskilled labour, which we may 
think of as the low-income country. The fact that some of its industries now no longer 
produce only for its domestic markets, but for world markets, means that output will 
increase and therefore also the demand for factors of production. Moreover, the 
demand will increase in particular for the factor of production used most intensively, 
i.e. unskilled labour. On the other hand this country will import skill- intensive goods, 
and this will reduce the domestic demand for skilled workers. This development will 
tend to reduce the skilled-unskilled wage differential in the low-income country, 
which was presumably high to begin with. 
 
Now let us look at a country with relatively much skilled labour. The wages of skilled 
labour there are relatively low, and the country therefore becomes an exporter of 
commodities that use skilled labour intensively. The wages of skilled labour go up, 
while the wages of the unskilled will tend to fall as the result of competition from the 
poor countries4. In the rich country, therefore, the skilled-unskilled wage differential 
will increase. Given time, this widening differential will create incentives for more 
workers to acquire skills, and this will close some of the initial gap in wages, although 
it is reasonable to think that some of it will remain. 
 
This analysis utilises the theoretical framework originally developed by the Swedish 
economists Eli Heckscher and Bertil Ohlin in the interwar period and refined by Paul 
Samuelson and a number of others during the subsequent decades5. They emphasised 
the implication that the opening of trade implies a movement towards factor price 
equalisation. In fact, given a number of rather specific assumptions, the theory 
implies that free trade will lead to full international equalisation of factor prices – and 
remember that this occurs without any international mobility of the factors 
                                                 
4 The theory as I have outlined it here assumes full employment of labour; those who lose from trade 
liberalisation take the loss only in the form of lower wages. This is obviously a simplification, and it is 
reasonable to assume that relative price changes due to trade liberalisation will have as one of its short-
term consequences  an increase in the unemployment rate. However, neither economic theory nor the 
lessons from history would lead us to expect a long-run relationship between openness and 
unemployment, so that the simplification made here is hardly a serious one. 
5 The orig inal analysis of the pattern of international trade as determined by countries' comparative 
advantage was published by David Ricardo in 1817. A good textbook treatment of both Ricardian and 
Heckscher-Ohlin models can be found in Krugman and Obstfeld (2000). 
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themselves. Thus, we have the remarkable theoretical result that free international 
trade in goods may have the same effects on factor prices and income distribution as 
if the factors themselves had been perfectly mobile between countries. But we do not 
have to believe in this strong version of the theory in order to accept the weaker 
hypothesis that trade implies a tendency towards the equalisation of factor prices.  
 
What happens if we assume that factors of production become mobile across 
international borders? The result of this assumption is more obvious than the case of  
commodity trade. Consider first the case of increased capital mobility. This will tend 
to equalise the rate of return to capital between countries, although it must be kept in 
mind that there are country-specific risks for which individual investors must be 
compensated in the form of a higher expected return. Country-specific risks may 
reflect investors' beliefs in the stability of the countries' policies and institutions. 
Countries that are seen as unstable in this sense may find it difficult to attract capital 
from abroad, even though the expected return in economic terms is high by 
international standards.  
 
Increased labour mobility will similarly tend to reduce international differences in 
wage rates. To see this, note that migration will tend to flow from labour-abundant 
countries, where wages are low, to countries of relative labour scarcity, where wages 
are relatively high. Labour supply increases in the rich country, depressing the wage 
level there, while it diminishes in the poor country, so that wages increase. If the 
migrants are primarily low-skilled workers, wage differentials increase in the rich 
country and diminish in the poor country. 
 
Two conclusions should be emphasised from this brief sketch of international trade 
theory. The first is that it is not necessary to assume that globalisation takes the form 
of massive movements of factors of production in order to conclude tha t it implies a 
tendency towards factor price equalisation; in this respect, commodity trade is a 
substitute for factor mobility. The second is that if we believe that poor countries have 
a comparative advantage in the production of commodities that use unskilled labour 
intensively, this implies a widening of skilled-unskilled wage differentials in the rich 
countries, such as Norway. This tendency is reinforced by direct labour migration if 
we assume that immigrants tend to consist of more unskilled workers than the 
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domestic population. It is naturally of interest to note that these hypotheses are 
consistent with a well-developed theoretical framework, and it is just as interesting to 
note that they a agree with a more common sense approach to problems of 
international trade. 
 
Before leaving this exercise in trade theory, there is a further conclusion that should 
be strongly emphasised. In a competitive world economy, all countries have the 
potential to gain from free trade in commodities in the sense that the ir aggregate 
incomes will increase. A more open economy benefits the citizens of a country in a 
number of ways. Through international trade the range of consumers' choice is 
expanded, since they are no longer bound to consume only the goods that their 
country is able to produce. Further, by specialising in the lines of production in which 
it has a comparative advantage, each country is able to increase the total value of its 
output. In addition, the opening up of the economy is likely to increase its degree of 
competitiveness and diminish the power of domestic monopolies, thereby leading to a 
more efficient utilisation of domestic resources. These gains do not imply that each 
and every individual or group will gain; as should be clear from the discussion above, 
some groups of factor owners will lose and some will gain. But adding up the gains 
and losses, the country as a whole should come up with a net gain. This suggests that 
the liberalisation of trade might be combined with a governmental policy of 
redistribution, transferring income from the gainers to the losers, which might in fact 
make everyone better off.  Whether this is a realistic possibility may, however, be 
open to some doubt, particularly when commodity trade liberalisation is combined 
with an increasing degree of international factor mobility. 
 
 
4. Redistribution policies in a world of factor mobility. 
 
In a closed economy with no or an insignificant amount of foreign trade, 
redistribution policies can be designed without any concern for international 
repercussions. Redistributive taxes on wage and capital incomes will distort factor 
prices relative to what they would have been in the absence of taxes, and this will 
have negative consequences for the efficiency of the economy. However, in a society 
that values both efficiency and equality, it will be rational to trade off some efficiency 
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in return for a more equitable distribution of income and resources. Liberalising the 
economy to allow for free trade in commodities does not raise any major problems in 
this regard. Evidently, the taxation of income from capital and labour might change 
wages and yields on capital in such a way that the country’s comparative advantage 
might be distorted. But in principle this is no different from the effects of taxation on 
domestic efficiency. The social loss may be derived from a less efficient use of the 
country's own productive resources, or from a less efficient utilisation of its 
comparative advantage. Whichever is the case makes no difference for the main 
principle: If society values equality, it is worth paying something to get more of it 
than the market system provides.  
 
Things become more complicated when we allow for the mobility of factors of 
production. Consider first the mobility of financial capital, which has increased 
significantly in recent years, partly due to deregulation, partly to a reduction in the 
costs of transaction. If individual investors are able to move their financial holdings of 
stocks, bonds and bank deposits around the world at low costs, there will be a 
tendency for the after-tax return on the various types of assets to be the same. 
However, there are also a large number of institutional investors who are exempt from 
tax, and their portfolio choices will tend to make the before-tax return uniform across 
countries. An equilibrium allocation of financial capital among countries therefore 
requires the equality of both before-tax and after-tax returns. But this equilibrium can 
only exist if countries choose to have the same rate of capital income taxation. 
International financial integration leads to a pressure towards international uniformity 
of taxes on capital income. And since returns on real capital can always be converted 
to returns on financial assets, the pressure towards international uniformity of tax 
rates is one that will hold for all kinds of capital. 
 
But the story does not stop there. If each individual country realises that it can attract 
more capital by lowering its tax rate, it has a strong incentive to do so. But if it does, 
other countries will respond, either by cutting their own taxes correspondingly or even  
reducing them further. This international tax competition will have as its end result a 
political equilibrium of capital taxation where the tax rate is zero. This may be a good 
thing from the point of view of the efficiency of the global allocation of capital, but 
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many will consider it to be unfortunate that politicians will lose an important 
instrument for redistribution policy within each single country. 
 
Let me now consider the consequences of increased mobility of labour, which raises 
even more interesting and challenging issues. As I have said before, labour 
immigration is still at a modest level in countries like Norway, but there is a potential 
for much higher levels. Moreover, it should be kept in mind that other welfare states 
have had much larger levels of immigration than we have so far experienced in 
Norway.  
 
Redistribution in the modern welfare state is of two kinds. One is truly interpersonal 
and goes mainly from the rich to the poor (although there are cases where government 
redistribution is regressive). But the other, which is quantitatively the more important, 
is intra-personal. It takes primarily the form of social security and social insurance 
and provides a social safety net against economic hardship due to old age, illness, 
unemployment etc. This redistribution is similar to private insurance, which also 
provides transfers between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ periods and states in an individual’s life. 
Progressive taxation and social security are the main instruments for redistribution 
policy, and both of them have elements of interpersonal as well as intra-personal 
redistribution. 
 
Why can one not rely on private insurance contracts to carry out the whole job of 
intra-personal redistribution? One reason why private markets with voluntary 
contracts do not perform well in this regard is due to the problem known as adverse 
selection. Suppose that one could buy private unemployment insurance at a premium 
which reflected the average risk (for the work force as a whole) of becoming 
unemployed. Who would be the most likely buyers of such an insurance policy? 
Clearly, it would be the people with above-average risk of becoming unemployed, 
while those with a risk below the average would find the premium too high. But this 
would lead to losses for the insurance companies and lead them to raise the premium - 
but then the insurance buyers as a group would become even more risky. The result 
could be that the market for private unemployment insurance would break down 
completely, and that the population as a whole would be without protection against 
one of the more severe risks in a modern industrial society.  
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One solution to this problem would be for the government to take it upon itself to 
provide unemployment insurance while making membership in the insurance scheme 
compulsory. This is exactly the solution chosen by most welfare states. The same is 
true with disability and sickness insurance, which raise similar problems for the 
efficient functioning of private insurance markets. 
 
Now suppose that each government has designed a welfare state with varying degrees 
of redistribution built into it. Say that country A has generous benefit payments 
financed by high and progressive taxes on income, while B has lower benefits and 
lower taxes. Then labour mobility between countries begins to rise. A mobile worker 
can now look at the countries as different insurance companies, each offering a 
different insurance policy. Which one should he choose as his country of residence? 
People with high earning ability and low risk of becoming unemployed will choose 
country B, while those with low earnings and high risks of unemployment and 
sickness will choose the more developed welfare state A.  The government of A then 
finds that its tax base is shrinking and may be forced to reduce its high taxes and 
generous benefits to make it more similar to country B6. 
 
But this is certainly not the whole story of migration, redistribution and the public 
sector. When considering migration, a person will have to consider a whole range of 
private costs and benefits in relation to the public sector. When making a choice 
between residence in countries A and B, a rational person will look not only at his 
total tax burden but also at his benefits from public expenditure. These benefits will 
be derived not only from social security and other transfers, but also from the supply 
of public goods and services. What could lead to substantial immigration or 
emigration would be large discrepancies between tax payments and benefits in each 
individual country. This would not prevent the survival of high-tax countries, but the 
high taxes would have to reflect correspondingly higher benefit levels, especially for 
the internationally mobile groups in the population. Both low-tax and high-tax 
countries might be forced to become less redistributive in terms of the total effects of 
taxes and public expenditure. 
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It should be added that, as emphasised by Tanzi (2000), market regulations have also 
played an important role in welfare state policies. This is especially true in the labour 
market, where many countries have a large set of regulations regarding minimum 
wages, working hours, health and safety, child labour, non-discrimination etc. Other 
markets where regulations have played an important role are energy, housing and 
transportation.  Some of the regulations have legal status, while others are the results 
of collective bargaining. Economists have often disagreed about the nature of 
regulations. Some see them as mainly the outcomes of private rent-seeking, while 
others consider them as attempts, although often misguided, to afford additional social 
protection to the less fortunate members of society. Whatever one's view of this, it 
seems clear that national regulations will be much harder to preserve with increasing 
mobility of labour and capital between countries. There may be efficiency gains, but 
there may also be elements of loss of social protection7.  
 
The theories that I have outlined above, although quite complex, are still much too 
simplified to be subjected to very simple empirical tests. One reason for this is clearly 
that the world is a much more heterogeneous place than indicated by the simple two-
country model that I have used, and there is a need to take account of individual 
countries' institutions and experience. Another reason is that the population and 
labour force of a country show much more variability in terms of abilities and 
preferences than indicated by the simple skilled-unskilled dichotomy; see Atkinson 
(1999). However, some of the trends suggested by the theory should be of fairly wide 
applicability. Let me therefore turn to an examination of some of the evidence and to 
consider whether this leads us to accept the theories in roughly the form that I have 
outlined them, or whether there are other matters of importance that have so far been 
left out.  
 
5. Some evidence. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
6 This argument has been formulated especially forcefully by Sinn (1990). See also Christiansen, 
Hagen and Sandmo (1994). 
7 The social benefits from labour market regulations have been analysed by Agell (1999, 2000). 
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Once we move away from the simplified theoretical picture of a two-country world, it 
is evident that the expected effects of globalisation must depend on its precise nature 
as regards the development of the pattern of international trade. A large part of the 
international trade of Western industrialised countries is with other industrialised 
countries. To the extent that globalisation just means more trade and factor 
movements within this group of countries, there is little reason to believe that its 
effects on inequality of factor incomes will be very pronounced. For if differences in 
the relative importance of skilled and unskilled labour are small, the factor price 
effects of international trade are likely to be small also. Things look different when 
we consider the movement of goods and factors between on the one hand the Western 
welfare states and on the other hand the third-world developing countries and the 
transition economies of Eastern Europe. Since the latter groups of countries are 
particularly well endowed with unskilled labour, our theory predicts that this should 
result in increasing inequality in the Western welfare states. Has this actually 
happened? 
 
This is not an easy question to answer. It is not enough to look at the development of 
income inequality indices over time, since this might reflect a number of different 
causes. Ideally, we would have liked to see a fully specified econometric model that 
could account for all the causes listed in Section 2 above as likely to effect inequality 
within each of the welfare states that we might be interested in. For each country we 
would then be able to identify the exact contribution made by globalisation to the 
observed change in inequality. Obviously, there are a number of severe problems of 
measurement here. Quite apart from the measurement of inequality (on which alone 
there is a large research literature), there is no self-evident way in which to derive 
aggregate measures of "technology" and "incentives". Not having recourse to such a 
grand model, we have to piece together what we know about the development of 
inequality, using a variety of sources and methods of measurement. 
 
Atkinson (1999) has studied data on income distribution for eight countries – The US, 
UK, Canada, New Zealand, France, Netherlands, Germany and Norway – for the 
period from the end of the 1970s to the end of the 90s. In particular, he has studied the 
development of inequality of gross earnings (wages and salaries), using the ratio of 
average earnings in the top to that of the bottom decile as his measure of inequality. 
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This is a very summary measure, but if the hypothesis of widening income 
differentials in Western countries were true, we would expect to see a steady rise in 
this ratio at least during most of the twenty years period. But this is in fact not what 
we see. There is a fairly steady rise in inequality for the US and the UK, while for 
France and Germany the trend is downwards. The other four countries, Norway 
included, show a mixed pattern with no obvious trend in the development of 
inequality (although we should note that for Norway Atkinson's data extend only to 
1991). Cross-country studies surveyed by O'Rourke (2001) do not lead to any firm 
conclusions regarding the relationship between openness and factor income 
inequality, at least not for the late 20th century. On a more aggregate level, Melchior 
& al. (2000) cite studies showing that, for the period 1967-1990, the experiences of 
the main economic regions of the world were substantially different. Inequality 
showed a slight increase for the industrialised world as a whole, it fell in the Middle 
East, South Asia and Latin America, and it first fell and then increased for Sub-
Saharan Africa. Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997), surveying the experiences of the 
OECD countries, emphasise that although there has been some increase in earnings 
inequality in almost all countries, the amount of increase, as well as the level of 
inequality vary widely among them. We must conclude that there is no firm support in 
the data for the theory that globalisation leads to more inequality of factor incomes. 
But the conclusion should be interpreted with care; it may e.g. be the case that the 
forces of globalisation take longer to make their effects felt and that the theoretical 
hypotheses will be confirmed by future studies. 
 
Second, our theoretical survey also suggested that the amount of redistribution carried 
out by governments is likely to go down. This should be reflected in increased 
inequality of disposable income, i.e. factor income or earnings minus taxes plus 
transfers. In Atkinson's study inequality of disposable income is measured by the Gini 
coefficient, which is a measure that varies from zero (when everyone earns the same) 
to one (when a single person has all earnings). The fact that inequality of factor 
income and disposable income has not been measured in the same way makes 
comparison between the two somewhat difficult. Keeping this in mind, however, it is 
interesting to note that there has been a marked increase of inequality in the US, UK 
and New Zealand, but none in Canada and France. As Atkinson (1999) points out, the 
different experiences of the US and Canada is particularly noteworthy, given their 
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geographical and cultural proximity and the large amount of trade between them. 
Canada seems to have chosen to neutralise the effect of increased earnings inequality 
by economic policy, while the US has not8.  Inequality has increased in Norway 
particularly since 1991, but inequality remains lower here than in the other seven 
countries. In general, it is the small countries which are most exposed to the forces of 
globalisation, so that one would expect both the level and upward trend of inequality 
to be more pronounced there than in the large countries. But no such pattern is 
discernible in the data.  
 
Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997) have studied the historical records of OECD 
countries as regards their responses to increased pre-tax inequality. Their general 
conclusion is that changes in tax and transfer policies tend to modify increasing factor 
income inequality, although there are large variations between countries. At one end 
of the scale are the United States, Australia and Japan where redistribution has done 
little to modify pre-tax inequality, and the United Kingdom, where public policies 
may even have contributed to more inequality. At the opposite end are countries like 
Canada, Finland and Norway, where inequality of disposable income has increased 
much less than factor incomes. Their results seem broadly consistent with those of 
Atkinson; in particular, the small and more open economies do not seem to be 
constrained in their redistribution policies by the forces of globalisation.     
 
This brief and selective survey of empirical studies seems to suggest that the 
application of standard economic theories to the likely effects of globalisation on 
inequality is unable to explain the development that we actually observe in a 
satisfactory manner. As regards the development of factor income inequality, the 
different experiences of individual Western economies are hardly consistent with a 
view that they are all exposed to the same forces of international competition from 
low-income countries. When it comes to the inequality of disposable income, the data 
indicate that individual countries actually have considerable freedom of action to 
design their tax and social security systems. The globalisation squeeze on the welfare 
state may actually be less severe than theories of international trade and public 
                                                 
8 The Canadian experience and the contrast to the United States has been discussed by Helliwell 
(2001). 
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economics might lead us to believe, and less than is frequently alleged in popular 
debates. 
 
6. Theoretical modifications. 
 
I would not like to draw the conclusion from this discussion that the standard theory is 
somehow "all wrong"; it points to chains of causation and economic trends that are 
part of the whole picture and may become more dominant in the future. But there is 
obviously something missing from the theoretical picture which has to be added on to 
the standard model. The list of additions and refinements could be made quite long; I 
will limit myself to commenting on two central aspects. 
 
One important feature of the standard neoclassical model of international trade is that 
it treats all markets as being perfectly competitive. When interpreted literally, this 
assumption is clearly wrong as a description of reality; the question is only how 
wrong it is. Although it is not difficult to find commodity markets whose behaviour 
differ from the predictions of the perfectly competitive model, the deviations may not 
be permanent or large enough to make much difference to the conclusions. However, 
this is different when it comes to the factor markets and in particular to the markets 
for labour. Empirical studies show that countries with strong trade unions tend to have 
both a lower level and a smaller increase of inequality than countries in which trade 
unions are weak (Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997). In addition, as argued by Atkinson 
(1999) social norms regarding fair wages and inequality may differ between countries 
and lead to wage structures that differ substantially from the competitive norm. This is 
likely to be more resistant to the forces of global competition that the competitive 
model would lead us to think. Indeed, we should probably think of trade unions and 
fair wage norms as being to some extent insurance devices, providing the individual 
worker some protection against fluctuating prices and output demand. Since these 
fluctuations are likely to be larger in open economies, such economies are likely to 
have less inequality of earnings and to have more resistance against exogenous forces 
that tend to increase inequality. 
 
When thinking about the future of the welfare state in the face of globalisation, one 
should also keep in mind that globalisation is a process which has been going on since 
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the end of World War II. This period has also been one of significant public sector 
expansion in the whole of the industrialised world. An empirical cross-country study 
by Rodrik (1998b) concludes that openness is the single most significant explanatory 
variable for the size of government, and that it is in the most open economies that 
government has expanded fastest. His interpretation of this result is that government 
is complementary to the market, particularly in providing insurance against the risks 
inherent in exposure to international competition. Moreover, especially in the 
advanced countries, openness tend to be particularly correlated with spending on 
social security and welfare, another indicator that increased openness does not imply a 
tendency towards a shrinking of the welfare state. Openness, rather than being a 
constraint on national redistribution policy, may in fact be one of the main causes 
behind the development of social safety nets and redistribution9. 
  
 
7. Concluding remarks. 
 
In this brief discussion of the effects of globalisation on inequality I have identified 
some reasons why we might expect an increased volume of commodity trade and 
factor movements to lead to increased income inequality in the rich countries. I have 
also discussed some of the reasons why more international mobility might lead to 
constraints on the redistributive policies of governments. 
 
Theory leads to hypotheses about the likely direction of economic changes, but it tells 
us little about the quantitative magnitudes of the effects. A cursory look at the 
evidence does not indicate that the effects so far have been very large. For some 
countries it appears both that inequality of earnings has gone up and that 
redistribution has gone down, but in other countries the pattern has been quite 
different.  
 
As we have already seen, the constraints on taxation and redistribution arise mainly 
from the possibility of increased mobility of the factors of production. A higher 
mobility of capital may release a process of capital tax competition between countries 
                                                 
9 An interesting discussion of these issues with particular reference to the Swedish experience is Olson 
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that may in the end result in the elimination of capital income taxation. So far, 
however, this has not happened. Perhaps the explanation is that country-specific 
uncertainties and transactions costs are important enough to neutralise differences in 
tax rates between countries. In the case of labour mobility transactions costs, widely 
interpreted, are obviously even more important, so that international differences in 
taxes, social security and provision of social goods may have rather modest effects on 
the amount of international migration. 
 
It is not clear which conclusions that one should draw from all this. One possibility is 
that globalisation does indeed have the effects that the theory indicates, but that there 
are many other forces at work simultaneously which may lead to different outcomes 
in different countries. In particular, openness may foster labour market institutions 
and government policies that promote equality and social protection. Another 
interpretation is that it is still too early to see the full effects of the process of 
globalisation, but that they will become more visible – and more in line with the 
predictions of the competitive model – with the passing of time. One certainly cannot 
reject these interpretations, but at the present time it still seems too early to conclude 
both that globalisation will increase inequality and that public policy is unable to 
neutralise it. 
 
Let me close with an important reminder. What I have focussed on here is the effect 
on inequality in the Western industrialised countries. The effects on inequality in the 
poor countries might well be very different, with the increased demand for unskilled 
workers raising their wages and leading to less inequality there. Moreover, free trade 
is a powerful engine for growth in the poor countries and has the potential to radically 
reduce global inequality. This dimension of the problem should definitely be kept in 
mind when we worry about the effects of trade liberalisation and globalisation on the 
amount of inequality in our own countries. 
                                                                                                                                            
(1990).  
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